Rising wet-bulb temperatures are set to render vast swaths of land uninhabitable before the end of the century. Many of these regions are densely populated and highly arable. The imminent exodus will number in the hundreds of millions – a challenge for any government in the developed world looking to secure their borders.
As demonstrated by the operation of offshore processing centres outside Australia, and the ‘keep them in Mexico’ policy implemented by the United States, in order to lawfully deny refugees their human rights, their processing must occur outside the borders of their destination country.
This logistical necessity represents a lucrative opportunity for private enterprises. Tenders for the operation of offshore detention centres benefit from minimal public scrutiny and closed bidding processes; in Australia, an initial $8mil offshore processing contract – offered to a private service provider – was inflated to $1.4bn through obscure amendments and minimal oversight.
Early investment in these companies will prove prudent, as the nepotistic and insider-favoured tendering process will guarantee long-term contract security. In the coming decades, as offshore processing capacity inevitably scales up in response to increased climate-change-induced migration, these key early players will continue to set the industry standard due to their extensive experience and established connections.
The countries in which these offshore processing facilities operate will inevitably be poor and ill-equipped to independently accommodate large influxes of refugees. These countries often suffer from weakened institutions, which in turn makes them susceptible to systematic corruption. The “lobbying” of key government officials will continue to be the easiest way to guarantee long-term inter-governmental cooperation; approaching negotiations through policy and diplomatic pathways will often prove time-consuming and futile.
This also means that there exists no financial incentives to invest in these ‘host’ countries, as the strengthening of their economies will lessen their dependency on the income created from hosting processing centres. Keeping these intermediary nations poor is, in effect, a key policy in the monetization of refugees.
Consequently, as these processing facilities inevitably expand in the coming decades, the wealth gap between nations paying for offshore/out-border processing and those that host them will continue to widen.
The primary beneficiaries of such a system are, of course, the private enterprises holding these offshore/out-border processing contracts. As with all for-profit corporations, they will demand increasingly absurd sums of money to exchange for the bare minimum level of service. This is, on a legal level, reasonable, as these companies must bear the consequences of inevitable human rights violations inside these facilities; and the more refugees there are, the more violations will occur. Fortunately, as was previously established, these legal challenges can be easily dismissed inside their hosts countries through the “lobbying” of key judicial bodies. After all, the shedding of legal responsibility was one of the key reasons for utilizing host countries in the first place.
The secondary beneficiaries are the wealthy nations paying for the operation of these facilities. Keeping refugees away is and always will be an appealing policy to a considerable percentage of the population. This cross-section will always maintain a degree of political representation; as long as this representation persists, there will be political advantages to the continuing maintenance of offshore facilities, regardless of the cost.
However, as the number of climate refugees approach a critical population threshold in the coming decades, there will be a fundamental shift in negotiating power between the wealthy nations paying for offshore processing and the host nations that house them.
It is predicted that the refugee crisis will be of such severity that the institutional stability of host nations themselves will be tested. There will be large swaths of land dedicated to the maintenance of the refugee population, yet any profit made by these facilities, along with any profitable product that may be produced – whether through forced labour or labour-for-expedited-processing – benefit only the private enterprises that operate them, not the host nation.
As the cost-benefit ratio of housing ever-larger refugee populations continue to decline, the host nations will threaten to void their agreement to house processing facilities, and unleash millions of refugees into wealthy nations, if certain financial and political demands are not met.
Although these demands may be met in the initial stages, the fundamental shift in negotiating power means that they will be ever-escalating. The threat of millions of refugees flooding into wealthy nations is such that any amount of compensation may be demanded for its prevention.
The only way to prevent the creation of this financial black hole is to take over the institutions of host nations entirely. In the short-term, wealthy nations will stage political coups to install regimes that are accepting of lopsided refugee-hosting arrangements; however, since there will be no improvement of circumstances for the local populace in real terms, these coups are unlikely to be stable over the long-term.
Since the invasion and occupation of host nations will effectively place refugees under the sovereignty of the invading nation, a hostile takeover will never occur. The only solution, therefore, is to facilitate sustained political instability in the host nation, such that the country as a whole cannot effectively negotiate on the behalf of itself.
This leads to my vision for the future:
Hundreds of millions of climate refugees flee from equatorial nations and other regions rendered uninhabitable by sustained heatwaves. Arable lands that might have fed millions of people are abandoned.
Wealthy, developed nations, confronted by this sustained migration crisis, enforces strict border policies, and pay vast sums of money to private contractors for the running of out-border processing facilities that are, effectively, indefinite detention centres, and potentially low-tech manufacturing hubs for forced labour. In exchange for unpaid work, a refugee may be placed an “expedited” queue for their refugee status application. Any legal challenges that arise in such scenarios are lodged in the local judiciary body, where the judges are “lobbied” by the facility operators to either dismiss complaints or dictate trivial amounts of compensation.
Outside these detention centres, the host nations are in a state of perpetual civil strife. Ethnic tensions are sustained; violence is commonplace. The local government is packed by an ever-rotating roster of individuals that have been “lobbied” by the facility operators. They are so rich that the combined wealth of a dozen individuals may exceed the yearly GDP of the entire nation.
Inside wealthy nations, there is vocal opposition to the operation of these facilities. However, many individuals and businesses have become stakeholders in the multinational conglomerate that operates the very same facilities that they morally object to. Many have profited from early buy-ins. Thus, opposition remains vocal-only.
Cheap goods flood the marketplace, produced by refugee labour. Ethical complaints are plentiful, but since people like cheap stuff, nothing substantial is done. Advocacy groups make localized progress in securing labour rights for refugees, and properly paid refugee workers producing cheap shoes while under indefinite detention is touted as a success story in the fight for equal working rights.
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Next blog: how climate change exacerbates authoritarianism, and how you can make money from it.